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DHCPV6 DNS THREATS

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VULNERABILITIES PRIOR TO NEW DHCPV6 OPTIONS

- Information disclosure unencrypted local observation of DNS packets
- Information disclosure logging, analyzing, use of private DATA at the DNS resolver supplied by DHCP
- Spoofing rogue DHCP servers sending decoy DNS resolver information
- Tampering DNS queries could be modified or responses modified or filtered
- Repudiation NXDOMAIN can be returned for records that exist
- Denial of service NXDOMAIN responses or error injection





MITIGATIONS PRIOR TO ADN DHCPV6 OPTION



	DNSSEC	Other
	X	TLS w/delay
'er	X	X
	X	PTR w/delay CERT val



MITIGATIONS WITH ADN DHCPV6 OPTION

Threat	DNSSEC	Other
Information disclosure on wire	X	TLS no delay
Information disclosure @ resolver	X	Reputation
Spoofing of resolver / MITM	X	CERT/DANE/SPKI PIN
Tampering	\checkmark	Reputation / SIG(0)
Repudiation		Reputation
Denial of service		Reputation





DO WE NEED A DNS RESOLVER **REPUTATION SERVICE?**

How would that work?







REPUTATION SERVICE

- HTTPS uses OCSP to get certificate revocation info
- DNS Resolvers could have a similar but different reputation service
- Operating system / DHCP client vendors could use whitelists/blacklists to filter DHCP resolvers from operators
- Insprivacy.org has provided a starting point of trustworthy DoT/DoH servers
- Authenticated resolvers with certs / DANE records are the basis for correctly identifying and cataloging the resolvers



SUMMARY

- DNSSEC provides the biggest gain in integrity when using DHCP provided DNS resolvers
- Authenticating the certificate of a TLS DNS resolver (DoT/DoH) provides integrity of the service and prevents MITM
- Knowing the ADN ahead of time, reduces delays, increases confidence
- Reputation services can augment trust relationship with unfamiliar resolvers and allow the community to effectively block bad actors
- Is it time to deprecate DNS over UDP between client and resolver to allow DNSSEC to proliferate?



